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PREFACE
The space shuttle is recognized throughout the world's technical community as the consummate
vehicle for space transportation. Its performance in placing humans and payloads in orbit and
returning products and satellites to Earth is unmatched. Since the vehicle was declared
operational in the mid-1980s, however, it has been severely criticized for the high cost of
operation. In addition, many of the promises made for the shuttle have never been realized for a
number of reasons. For example: .1) the number of flights per year that were forecast never
materialized; 2) the Challenger accident temporarily cast doubt on shuttle reliability; 3) the
number of payloads by other U.S. Government agencies (particularly the Department of Defense)
was overestimated, with many transferred to other launch vehicles; 4) policy (e.g., National Space
Policy) and statutory changes were made to discourage the use of the shuttle as a launch vehicle
except for missions that require human presence or other unique shuttle capabilities; 5) NASA
continued to operate the shuttle in a quasi-research and development mode; this was exacerbated
by the Challenger accident.
The NASA Administrator has attempted-by various means, and with reasonable success, to
reduce the total cost of operating-the shuttle. In recent years, NASA has reduced the shuttle's
direct operating costs by approximately 25 percent--a.valiant effort considering the scrutiny the
shuttle receives by the government and the press. As more budget pressures are brought to bear
and NASA searches for funds to use in pursuit of future programs, however, it became obvious to
the Administrator that he should seek possible changes in the shuttle management structure. As a
result of discussions with a number of advisors in the government, the aerospace industry, and
former NASA leaders,, the Administrator decided to form a t_. composed of some of these
people to review the present shuttle operationmanagement and to proposeinnovative approaches
to significantly decrease total operating costs while maintaining systems safety.
J/
If NASA is successful in bringing about a new approach to ._spaceflight operations, it will add to
NASA's credibility as in agencyon the forefront ofreinventing g°vernment and provide a model
for the management of:future programs and their transition to the private sector.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At the request of the NASA Administrator a team was formed to review the Space Shuttle
Program and propose a new management system that could significantly reduce operating costs.
Composed of a group of people with broad and extensive experience in spaceflight and related
areas, the team received briefings from the NASA organizations and most of the supporting
contractors involved in the Shuttle Program. In addition, a number of chief executives from the
supporting contractors provided advice and suggestions.
The team found that the present management system has functioned reasonably well despite its
diffuse structure. The team also determined that the shuttle has become a mature and reliable
system, and--in terms of a manned rocket-propelled space launch system--is about as safe as
today's technology will provide. In addition, NASA has reduced shuttle operating costs by about
25 percent over the past 3 years.
The program, however, remains in a quasi-development mode and yearly costs remain higher than
required. Given the current NASA-contractor structure and incentives, it is difficult to establish
cost reduction as a primary goal and implement changes to achieve efficiencies. As a result, the
team sought to create a management structure and associated environment that enables and
motivates the Program to further reduce operational costs.
Accordingly, the review team concluded that the NASA Space Shuttle Program should
(1) Establish a clear set of program goals, placing a greater emphasis on cost-efficient operations
and user-friendly payload integration.
(2) Redefine the management structure,, separating development and operations and disengaging
NASA from the daily operation of the space shuttle. //
(3) Provide the necessary environment and conditions within the program to pursue these goals.
-With over 65 successfu! launches, operations have become quite reliable. At this stage in the-
Shuttle Program, cost-efficient operations and user-friendly payload integration should be pursued
along with safe and successful flights. If the Program is to meet the challenge of reducing Costs
and streamlining payload integration, it will require a major change in how the Program operates.
Given the maturity of the vehicle, a change to a new mode of management with considerably less
NASA oversight is possible at this time. In addition, the bureaucracy that has developed over the
program's lifetime---and particularly since the Challenger accident--will be difficult to overcome
and the optimum operational effectiveness of the system will be difficult to achieve unless a new
management system is provided,.
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The team considered a number of new management approaches. These included to
(1) Stay with the present system and continue to decrease costs in the incremental fashion used
to date.
(2) Implement a multi-node system, consolidating contracts in each of the major geographical
areas (i.e., the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama,
and Johnson Space Center in Texas), each managed by a prime contractor with continued
NASA program management.
(3) Consolidate operations under a single-business entity.
The team concluded that consolidating operations under a single-business entity was the most
advantageous. This single-business approach is a change from the present one of government
control with industry response to that of government direction with industry operation.
The muki-node approach possesses some of the same features that cause the present system to be
cumbersome and expensive. Both options (1 and 2) do not provide the centralization of control
necessary to eliminate duplication, the disengaging :of NASA from day-to-day direction necessary
to reduce requirements, and the incentives necessary to motivate cost reduction. One of the
critical deficiencies in today's program management, and one that the multi-node approach also
suffers from, is the lack of a single responsible agent among all of the contractors supporting the
program.. As a result, no one entity feels the total responsibility for the shuttle operation;
therefore, no advocate exists for overall cost reduction. This deficiency is the major fault with
both the current program structure and the multi-node concept.
Several different single-business approaches were discussed with the prime contractor option
considered the most achievable and practical. Other concepts, including a business consortium,
joint venture, and government owned-contractor operated (GOCO) arrangement, involve
complexities that are difficult to overcome in any reasonable period of time. In a'ddition, selecting
a prime contractor from among the current contractors, as opposed to an open competition, could
accomplish all of the objectives in a less disruptive and more expeditious manner, realizing
potential cost reductions more quickly.
The proposed single-business management system will require a steadfast commitment from both
NASA and the aerospace industry to ensure success. NASA must be willing to define clear
shuttle operating requirements with limited oversight. The prime contractor must be willing to
assume responsibility for safe and productive operations. This requires the assignment of
competent and experienced people at all levels and the direct attention of top management. For
its commitment, the contractor must be rewarded with appropriate incentive fees. The
government in-turn must provide Similar talent in program management and a guarantee that the
contractor will not be encumbered with burdensome and unnecessary oversight.
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Thenew managementapproachwill requirethefollowing immediateactions:
(1) Freezethe current vehicle configuration, minimizing future modifications, with such
modifications delivered in bloc updates. FutUre bloc updates should implement modifications
required to make the vehicle more re-usable and operational.
(2)- Perform a requirements review, top down, with the goal of significantly reducing checkout
and other requirements based upon operations experience.
(3) Consolidate and reduce program and project elements, limiting NASA involvement in
operations and minimizing NASA-contractor interfaces.
(4) Restructure and reduce the overall Safety Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA)
elements--without reducing safety.
(5) Streamline payload processing and integration, minimizing costs and reducing the length of
time required to integrate a .payload aboard the space shuttle.
(6) Structure operational contracts to provide real incentive to reduce costs while accomplishing
safe and successful missions.
(7) Allow the hiring of NASA personnel by the prime and subcontractors to ensure proper
expertise and talents e ._.st to continue with safe and successful operations.
One of the major stipulations to achieve cost reduction is to freeze the present shuttle
configuration and perform only those changes required to carry out the individual flights.
Currently, change and update are continual and pervasive at all levels of the program and seize a
-significant amount of attention, focus, and resources. To become an operational program, the
shuttle configuration must be more stable. To aid in the transition process, the present NASA
management system would complete the development of presently approved changes and then be
,phased outi -
Additionally, turnaround, launch, and mission requirements should be / diminished based on
operational experience. Currently, for the orbiter alone, approximately 150 hardware package
changeouts are performed between each flight; yet an average of only 10 in-flight anomalies, most
of which are inconsequential, occur during each mission. Maturation of the vehicle checkout
requirements has, clearly, not kept pace with the Vehicle hardware, and redundant subsystems are
not being used to provide operational flexibility.
Once the new management structure is in place, efficiencies can be realized through the
consolidation, reduction, and elimination of functions. This will be a challenging task considering
tile diffuse state of the current NASA-contractor structure. Duplication and overlap have
developed throughout the program. .
One of the most apparent examples in this regard is the area of SR&QA. As a result of the
Challenger incident, a "safety shield" philosophy has evolved creating a difficult management
situation. Managers, engineers, and business people are reluctant to make decisions that involve
risk because of the fear of persecution. AS a result, a parallel and independent SR&QA element
has grown to large proportions. This is not only significant with respect to direct costs, but has
an even greater impact when supporting efforts are included. Restructuring and streamlining
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SR&QA throughout the Shuttle Program, maintaining only the necessary checks and balances,
must be accomplished to achieve significant cost reduction.
As the Shuttle .Program transitions to an operational program, payload processing must be
streamlined, with an associated reduction in cost and length of time required to integrate a
payload. As this takes place, payload operations must change from "'defensive" to more
customer-oriented. Toward this end, payload operations would become an integral part of
mission and launch operations with attendant streamlining of organizations, people, and
procedures.
To assume greater operational responsibility and risk, it will be necessary to provide the
contractor with the opportunity to realize a profit. Proper contract incentives will be needed to
ensure the contractor team performs the necessary steps to reduce cost. Greater and longer term
sharing of cost savings, along with appropriate penalties for marginal performance, will be
required to provide the contractor with the motivation to significantly reduce costs while
maintaining safe and successful operations.
Finally, ensuring the NASA-contractor team has the expertise required to operate the shuttle is of
significant concern. In the present aerospace industry, it may be difficult to assemble all of the
necessary talent and resources to assume the responsibility for shuttle operations. Therefore,
initially, this will require private industry to hire NASA personnel and/or utilize specific
government engineering organizations with critical skills until these skills can be developed from
within. It is also important when constructing the contractor team to recognize current expertise
that has already been developed. An example of this is in the areas of orbiter obsolescence and
sustaining engineering where specific expertise and experience is necessary to continue to operate
the vehicle. Building the NASA-contractor team will require Special attention to these types of
issues. /
The transition process will entail the development of a program office by the selected prime
contractor. The present NASA program and project offices would be used to aid the prime
contractor through the initial development of this new operating concept. As the contractors'
skills mature, they would continually assume greater responsibility. The team believes this
transition should be expedited with the overall transition time dependent on the specific shuttle
element, the techniques employed by NASA tO rearrange the contractual responsibility, and the
commitment by all parties to bring about these significant changes.
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INTRODUCTION
Charter
In November 1994, the NASA Administrator asked Dr. Christopher C. Kraft to form a team of
individuals external to the agency to evaluate the resources being expended on the Space Shuttle
Program. The team was chartered to appraise the current set of processes used in performing
shuttle operations at the Johnson,. Kennedy, Marshall, and Stennis space centers, and to
recommend alternative operational concepts that could significantly reduce operating costs.
Additionally, the team was asked to develop an approach that would aid in the transition of
agency functions to any new organizational and/or management structures proposed.
The Shuttle Management Review Team formed by Dr. Kraft comprised aerospace executives,
business leaders, and former NASA officials. They were:
Dr. Christopher Kraft, Team Chairman, '-
Former Director of the Johnsoii Space Center
Col. Frank Borman,
Former Eastern Airlines chief executive officer and retired astronaut
George Jeff's,
Former president of Rockwell International's North American Aerospace Operations
Robert Lindstrom,
Former senior vice president and general manager for Space Operations at Thiokol Corporation
and retired manager of the Space Shuttle Projects Office at Marshall Space Flight Center
Thomas Maultsby,
Vice president of General Research Corporation and former senior Department of Defense
representative to NASA Headquarters
Isom Rigell,
Former vice president, Florida Operations for United Space Boosters, Inc., and retired director,
shuttle payloads and former director, launch vehicle operations at the Kennedy Space Center
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The focus of the team was to
(1) Determine how the shuttle operations budget is being utilized.
(2) Determine the major cost drivers to the principal functions within the Shuttle Program.
(3) Develop a new model or concept for shuttle operations with the potential for significantly
reducing operating costs.
(4) Define a transition approach to move the agency to the new operations concept.
Theteam limited its scopeto the ShuttleProgram,consideringthe InternationalSpaceStation
Programonly whenit wasdrivingshuttlerequirements.
To meetthe statedobjectives,the team
(1) Held reviews with each of the organizations performing a major function within the Shuttle
Program at Johnson, Kennedy, and Marshall space centers.
(2) Talked with NASA and contractor personnel directly involved in performing or managing
shuttle operations.
(3) Met with the chief executive officer, or his representative, of each of the major Shuttle
Program contractors to discuss ideas for the new shuttle operations concept.
(4) Reviewed a summary of the findings of the Space Shuttle Functional Workforce Review,
Johnson Space Center Teams for Level II/Orbiter/Mission Operations
Directorate/Engineering Directorate.
Thetearn's detailed activities and proceedmgs are lncluded-as'_t_endix B.
OF Iz'O0_._ QU_uJTV
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OBSERVATIONS
Throughout the review, the SpaceShuttleProgramwas found to be successful,operating a
matureandreliablevehicle. The ShuttleProgramhasperformedmorethan65 successfulflights,
deliveringits variedcomplementof payloadsto orbit andaccomplishingnearlyall of its mission
objectives.Theperformanceof themachineasa spacetransportationsystemhasbeenremarkable
giventhe difficult operatingconditionsandmanagementenvironment.Thepreflight operational
partsof the programareexcellentin delivering,preparing,assembling,and readyingthe vehicle
for flight. Optim_al flight designsandplansaredevelopedand executedfor diverseandcomplex
payloadoperations. Crew and flight controller readinessfor both nominal and contingency
operationsareunmatched.Overthe lastseveralyears,while performingsevento eightflightsper
year,the ShuttleProgramhascontinuedits successfulperformancewhile incrementallyreducing
operatingcostsbyapproximately25 percent.
Yet, with all.of its accomplishments,the programremainsin a quasi-developmentmodewith the
associated overhead and expenses. It continues to operate with large program and support
functions supported by a b_vy of contractors. Large maintenance and operations efforts are
required to support the processing and operations facilities at the various centers. The continuous
review process used to bring about reductions in operating costs has had a material effect on
morale and caused management frustrations because of a lack of an overall plan, clearly defined
goals, and risk taking flexibility delegated to managers. Significant resources are expended on
managing and coordinating many elements and their associated contracts, each being driven and
influenced by: diverse factors.
. -
The current structure makes it difficult to implement changes to achieve the potential operational
efficiency and minimum cost of the system. This has resulted in over-extenSive requirements,
overlapping engineering support, and complex payload processing. Further problems are evident
in the safety environment, contract management culture, and NASA-contractor structure.
Requirements Driven System
The large number of vehicle processing and turnaround requirements remains driven by the
philosophy, structure, and focus typical of a development organization. While numerous
efficiencies have been realized, processing requirements and labor hours remain quite high. In the
past 5 years, operational maintenance requirements and specifications have decreased from
approximately 11,000 to 8,000, while labor hours per vehicle processing have decreased from
- about 1,000,000 to 750,000. Both advancements are significant. The program, however, remains
encumbered by this cyclical processof requirement stipulation and execution. At the core of this
large number of requirements exists the inherent developmental requirements philosophy of the
program, the continual testing and analysis requirements, and the ever-changing vehicle hardware
and software.
The systems redundancy and turnaround requirements philosophy for operating the shuttle has
changed little since the beginning of the program. The shuttle was designed with two, three, and
sometimesevenfour levelsof subsystemredundancy.While in the early stages of the program
this redundancy was used for safety, it was intended that as operational experience was attained
that subsystem redundancy would also be used for operational flexibility. It is clear this
progression has not occurred since launch constraints still require that the shuttle launch with very
few anomalies and ground testing is routinely performed on much of the hardware, even if it
performed flawlessly on its previous mission. As a result, each redundant element continues to be
verified every time a vehicle is prepared for flight, resulting in a large and invasive set of
turnaround requirements. In addition, the current practice of adding non-mandatory checkout
requirements by piggy-backing on other work further burdens and complicates the turnaround
process and subjects the hardware to additional and unnecessary operation. As a result of this
process approximately 15.0 hardware package changeouts are performed each time the orbiter is
prepared for another flight; yet an average of only 10 in-flight anomalies, most of which are
inconsequential, occur each mission. Clearly, the program's requirements-based philosophy has
not matured with the vehicle hardware and the majority of hardware lifetime is unnecessarily
being expended on ground testin_ and checkout.
Additionally, ttib-'bageline ch-gckout requirements are suppieraented by numerous testin'g--an-d
-analysis requested by the large engineering presence in the system. Rather than being dealt with in
a return-to-print fashion, to0many discrepancies result in detailed analysis and testing throughout
the program and by the vendor. While this is appropriate for developmental hardware, a
demonstrated hardware capability requires this type of testing and analysis much less frequently.
Yet with the over-abundance of engineers distributed throughout the program, there is a tendency
for their function to become self-fulfilling routinely creating an inordinate amount of analysis,
testing, replacement, and tear-down requirements.
_ Finally, many requn-ements result from a frequently changing vehicle configuration, both hardware
and software. Vehicle hardware changes are being implemented in a continuous and piecemeal
fashion withs0ftware changes delivered in the form of yearly operational increments. As an
example, more than 20 different vehicle modifications are currently in work to gain 13,000 lb. of
additional performance to support space station missions. Many of these performance
enhancements have associated modifications to both hardware and software. Hardware and
software changes have a cascading impact on the entire program, including turnaround
requirements, operating procedures, support documentation, •crew training, and ground system
changes. Change and update are continual and pervasive at all levels of the program and require
significant attention, focus, and resources.
All of these conditions are typical of a research and development program with an immature
vehicle configuration. Yet after 65 successful launches and over a year of in-flight time, most
shuttle systems have demonstrated outstanding performance, certainly worthy of reducing the
abundance of routine requirements. A significant reduction in operational cost cannot occur
without addressing the numerous requirements and the many factions which drive them.
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Contract Proliferation and Overlap
There are a vast number of support, engineering, processing, and production contracts of varying
sizes and complexities within the Shuttle Program. Tables listing some of the larger contracts and
their associated contractors and costs across the program is presented in Appendix C. These
tables demonstrate the scope of what must be dealt with in consolidating and reducing the total
number of contractors. Many of the larger contracts have team members as well as prime
contractors, and some of the production contracts have numerous major subcontractors and
directed subcontractors. Consolidation or elimination of overlapping contracts and functions
across contracts must be considered if NASA is to further reduce costs.
From this complex contractor structure, multiple and overlapping engineering analysis
organizations have evolved. These organizations exist at the three major centers as well as within
the program and project offices. For example, the Johnson Space Center has a large engineering,
test, and analysis contract within the Engineering Directorate that supports cargo integration;
p_.azload safety enginee.'.ring; flight-to-flight guidance, navigation, and control; and_analysis of
integrated flight systems and performance-upgrad_g-to the vehirle. Likewise, the support
contractor to the Systems and Cargo Engineering Office in the Shuttle Program Office is
responsible for 'managing the payload and integrated systems safety process and the integrated
vehicle ascent desigia criteria and defining and managing the integration of new capabilities and
performance enhancement development to support the Space Station.
At-the Kennedy Space Center, numerous organizations perform engineering analysis on the
orbiter, external tank, solid rocket booster, solid rocket motor, and main engines. The project
" _ =Offices contain groups of engineering efforts that track the progress of their respective elements
through theprocessing flow and monitor the integration effort of the shuttle processing contract.
Problems that arise duff.rig processing or a mission on any one of the shuttle elements brings an
inordinate amount of attention from the engineering factions withiffthe project office, Shuttle
•Processing Contract and design center organizations.
Payload Processing
Although the shuttle is attractive to potential customers because of its reliability and mission
success record, NASA's philosophy regarding payload processing can be described as nearly an
aversion to carrying payloads. As a result, the Shuttle Program has, developed a philosophy of
compliance versus one of advoeation--a philosophy that is not customer oriented. Because of
this philosophy, a myriad of safety requirements is levied on customers in the areas of electrical,
pyros, propellants, data systems, vibrations, acoustical, structural, thermal, EMI, contamination,
etc. These extensive and inflexible requirements have a significant impact on the design and
integration of onboard payloads, including the associated development, testing, and analysis.
Additionally, payloads are currently required to be introduced into the flow well over a year prior
to launch. While this is a significant improvement over several years ago, the integration template
remains diffuse and complex with many interdependencies between the functions of cargo
engineering, flight design, simulation development, and safety evaluation. Continuing to simplify,
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compact, and tailor the integration template will be required to make the program more efficient
in processing payloads and more attractive to customers.
Relationship Between Program and Center Management
Program management in NASA has undergone a number of changes over the past 25 years--
changes that have evolved into isolation from center management. Early in the Mercury Program,
the number of NASA people was relatively small and the designation of responsibility was easy
and straightforward. As the programs grew, however, the addition of larger organizations,
functional groups, diverse responsibilities, and multiple program support were required.
The centers involved adopted the traditional matrix management style prevalent in the aerospace
industry. This allowed both NASA and its contractors to function together with a complete
understanding of each other's way of doing business, and in particular, the decision-making
process. NASA Headquarters established a working relationship with the centers based on this
..... organizational style, and it functioned extLemely_well_ t_gughout theApollo and _early Space
Shuttle Programs.
o
The post-Challenger organization modified this, and the advent of the Space Station resulted in
further changes that have generated confusion within and among NASA Headquarters, the
centers, and the contractors as to responsibility and decision making. It is now increasingly
difficult for center management to provide the classical technical inputs to program management
and to provide the customary checks and balances that were essential in previous programs. In
addition, the lack of a strong and effective interface between program and center management can
/: lead tO dupiicati0n:ofresbufces , since the pro_ may develop a capability or technical expertise
that alread3_ exists within the center.
j' .
Fortunately; the pre-ChaUenger traditions of the Shuttle Program Office have continued to allow
reasonable center inputs and rational decision making; however, the close working relationships of
the past between center and program management are in decline and need rebuilding. Of greatest
concern in this area is the Space Station Program. While the team did not look at this program in
any depth; the situation described, almost universally by the engineering staff, was that the
• management style and structure of the Space Station Program was creating problems and
fi-ustration. Specifically, they found it difficult to provide engineering inputs and to make
suggestions relative to design, operations, cost savings, or lessons learned. This trend toward
isolation of program management from center managemen.t is of concern to the review team.
Recently, the NASA Administrator has taken some steps to rectify this situation, but the results of
the management style followed in the last 10 years will take time to change and the programmatic
effects have to be resolved.
Safety Environment
The Challenger incident created a safety environment in NASA that is duplicative and expensive.
After the accident in 1986, significant growth of the SR&QA element took place. A
corresponding increase in oversight throughout the entire program followed. Recent studies have
shownthat thenumberof people associated with the SR&QA effort may be as great as 4000 and
cost in excess of $350 million.
The "safety shield" that has been built has created a difficult management situation. Managers,
engineers, and business people are reluctant to make decisions that involve risk because of the
fear of persecution. Safety is one of those terms that can be used to hide behind and prevent
necessary change and innovation.
This is not to say that safety and reliability are to be ignored. Human spaceflight is an inherently
risky business; yet these risks can be managed effectively. The Shuttle Program has been
successful because the lives of the astronauts are in the mind of every worker in the program. The
environment created by this attitude is what has produced the marvelous hardware and software
systems that fly in space today. This success is not the result of an inordinate amount of oversight
nor a paper world that has been set up to provide an illusory sense of security. Indeed, the system
used today may make the vehicle less safe because of the lack of individual responsibility it brings
about ...... _ __:
The management changes propgsed in this report will most certainly be criticized by the status
quo as a threat to safety.. Many people who are accustomed to the present cumbersome
techniques that have developed in the shuttle era will hide behind the "'safety shield." The
challenge lies in requiring NASA and its contractors to totally revamp these expensive habits an_l
still operate a safe and reliable vehicle.
Contra.ct Management Culture
The heritage of NASA by way of NACA is based on technical competence, invention and know-
how. There is no airplane flying or space vehicle orbiting th_at does not possess some quality or
form that was provided by the ingenuity of NACA/NASA. The early days of aviation, like the
early days of spaceflight, benefited immeasurably by the unerring research and development
capabilities of an organization dedicated to excellence.
Former Senator Proxmire, in a speech on the Senate floor, once said that even though he didn't
agree with spending the taxpayers' money on some things that NASA wanted to do, he
recognized that NASA was the best run agency in the government. The reputation and integrity
of an institution such as NASA is a commodity that should be preserved.
When NASA was established by government charter in 1958, NACA was the nucleus around
which the new space agency was built. NASA's new assignments at that time required hiring a
large number of new people. Because of the demand for experienced engineers and scientists,
NASA found it necessary to contract for some of these people from the aerospace industry. The
NASA-industry team that resulted was responsible for building the new hardware and producing
the vehicles necessary to begin the exploration of space. As in any maturing organization, the use
of this contract process as an expedient has flourished and become a part of the normal way of
doing business at NASA, even at the so called research centers.
With the passingof 30-plusyears,NASA hasbecomemoreandmore a contractmanagement
agencyand lessand lessanagencywhose people are notedfor their technicalprowess. This
statementis not a new revelationand hasbeenspokenandwritten by a numberof pastNASA
Administratorsand leaders. One [/ighly regarded NASA scientistrecently put it this way:
"Peopleusedto cometo NASA for information,now theycomefor a contract." This is pointed
out not to lambasteNASA, but to emphasizethe needto restorethat internaltechnicalexpertise,
continuingthe traditionsNASA hasbeenrecognizedfor andallowing the aerospaceindustry to
do thesame.
NASA-Contractor Structure
Many inefficiencies and difficulties in the current Shuttle Program can be attributed to the diffuse
and fragmented NASA and contractor structure. Numerous contractors exist supporting various
program elements, resulting in ambiguous lines of communication and diffused responsibility.
This type of fragmented structure and: contract management provides little promise for significant
cost reductions. As. a result, budget reductions tend to be directed from above instead of cost
_ savings identified from •below. - =-'_ ......... -=
In such an organizatidn, neither NASA nor the contractors are provided the environment or
motivation to make significant _zhanges to reduce cost. On the contrary, NASA and its
contractors are.both internally driven to increase responsibilities, create new functions, and
acquire larger budgets. This lends itself to the creation of overlapping tasks and the development
of redundant capabilities._. The: Shuttle Program rn-uSt de voI, e -a:-_cant amount of time and
resources to contract management atidcon/xa_or: 'iilte_htiofi_' _rbitration, and conciliation.
C6ordinating,_between the NASA Organizations and contractors just to accomplish daily
operations b_mes:a significant task.. Introducing Changeto eliminate inefficiencies tends to be
frustrating and rejected by 'many parties.
Even though many of the contracts are st_ed with award fees, most contracts fail to motivate
the contractor to significantly reduce costs. Base and award fees tend to be relatively high with
little investment made or risk taken by the contractor. While cost reductions might assure a one-
time award fee, they reduce the contract base on which the fee for all future years is determined.
This isdifferent from private industry _¢here profit and cost directly motivate the process, with
cost savings rewarded every year they are realized.
To make significant reductions in cost, the expertise of identifying and implementing specific ideas
must come from NASA and the contractor. Instead of making detailed specific cost saving
recommendations, the review team provides in the remainder of this report a NASA-contractor
program structure and associated environment that will enable and motivate the Shuttle Program
to apply its expertise and identify and implement such efficiencies.
OI_IQINAL PAGE ilS
OF POOR QUALITY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the current structure and condition of the Space Shuttle Program, it is the conclusion of
this independent review team that significant additional reductions in cost will be difficult without
a new and innovative approach. This new approach must transition the current program to a
more operational program and introduce cost-effective operations as a primary goal. To achieve
this goal, a new NASA and contractor management structure will be required. This new structure
must provide greater contractor responsibility for standard and daily operations, enabling NASA
to pursue new opportunities in •space exploration. In addition, a number of conditions will be
required to enable this new structure to overcome many of the impediments of the current
program and realize numerous efficiencies.
Therefore, it is the conclusion of this independent review team that the Shuttle Program should
....... (1) Establish a clear set of program goals, placing ffgreater emphasis on'e--fficient operations and
payload integration. -'-
(2) Redefine the management'structure, separating development and operations, and disengaging
NASA from the routine operation of the space shuttle.
(3) Provide the necessary environment and conditions within the program to pursue these goals.
Based upon the maturity of the shuttle system, now is an opportune time for a change in
management structure. The review team has found a stable, high performing work force,
including thecontractor base. Contractor performance ratings indicate their proficiency at
performing the required tasks.. The shuttle has flown over 65 flights in the last 13 years
accumulating more than a year of flight time while establishing a large database and reducing
° . . :f.
hardware problems. Flight anomalies have declined to a near insignificant level. Test and
processing procedures have stabilized. As a result of these favorable conditions, the opportunity
to significantly reduce costs by transitioning to an operational program with reduced NASA
involvement can and should be exercised at this time.
Space Shuttle :Program Goals
Recommendation 1" Establish a more balanced set of goals for the Shuttle Program, with a
greater emphasis on reducing operational costs and making payload integration more user
friendly. The following goals provide a better balance between operations and safety, and address
the overall NASA objective of reducing the cost of access to space.
(1) Perform safe space shuttle operations while accomplishing mission objectives.
(2) Reduce the cost of space shuttle operations.
(3) Provide user-friendly payload integration.
The Shuttle Program has successfully maintained flight safety while accomplishing mission
objectives; however, streamlined spacecraft operations and user-friendly payload integration needs
to be pursued more vigorously. A more balanced approach in pursuing the above goals will
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requirethe programto makecost/riskevaluations.Carefulconsiderationwill needto begiven to
all changesandtheir downstreamramificationsto overall operationof theshuttle. Futurechanges
to theshuttleshouldnot only bemadeto enhanceoperations,but also,asrequired,to test future
technologies.All levelsof the programneedto pursuecost-efficientoperationsanduser-friendly
payloadintegrationwith thesamevigor assafeandsuccessfulflights.
Space Shuttle Program Management Structure
Recommendation 2: Modify the program's management structure, separating development from
operations and relinquish the majority of the operational responsibility to a prime contractor.
To best meet the program goals, a new innovative management structure, separating development
from operations, and transitioning the majority of operations responsibility to industry must be
made. NASA interfaces on the daily repetitive operations of the space shuttle can be minimized
and the contractor, given the proper incentive, will have the opportunity to eliminate non2essential
effort.
.Management Structure Options Considered
°
A number of NASA-contractor' management
examined.
concepts, including the current structure, were
Option 1: Maintain the current program structure continuing the incremental reduction
emphasis.
Option 2: Implement a multi-node system that breaks the program into several (two or
three)£ parts, each managed by a prime contractor with continued NASA
program management.
Option 3: Consolidate operations undera single-business entity. /
The review team identified the single-business entity approach as the most advantageous.
Option 1 would allow NASA to continue, to pursue consolidation and elimination of functions
and thereby decrease the" many NASA-to-contractorlnterfaces. NASA would need to
significantly reduce the excessive safety element. This would be followed by reducing
requirements based on the vehicle's reliable and redundant capabilities for operational flexibility.
The review team determined that while conceptually this approach may be possible, in practical
terms the motivational and management difficulties could not be fully resolved. With this type of
structure, the combined NASA-contractor organization is not uniformly or directly motivated to
substantially reduce costs. Cost reductions will become increasingly more difficult to accomplish
within the civil service since further cost efficiencies will primarily come from human resources,
and people are generally not motivated to eliminate their own jobs. Similarly, contractors have
superficial incentive to reduce costs, in that it is more to their advantage to maintain as large a
base as possible rather than making significant cuts to realize a short-lived award fee. This type of
overall structure, which promotes numerous interfaces between NASA and the contractor,
10
requiressignificantoverhead. Identification and eliminationof overlappingand unnecessary
functionsbecomescontroversialanddifficult for NASA to resolve.
Finally,the reviewteambelievesthat anunderlyinggoalof NASA's shouldbeoneof technology
developmentfollowedby thetransferof this technologyto privateindustry. This allowsNASA
to moveon to futuretechnologydevelopmentandotherspaceexplorationventures.Givensucha
charter,andthecurrentmaturityof thevehicle,theapproachfor theShuttleProgramshouldbeto
permitdisengagementof NASA from daily operations.
Option 2 would createtwo or thr_e distinctprimary contractors. Severaldifferentmulti-node
approacheswereconsidered,includinga division similarto the Marshall,Kennedy,andJohnson
functionsof today. In a dual-nodeapproach,one contractornodewould be responsiblefor
launchoperations,including receiving,assemblingand preparingall hardware. The other node
wouldberesponsiblefor missionandcrewoperations,alongwith payloadintegration.
- Oneof the critical deficienciesin today's programmanagement,and orie that the-multi-node
approachalsosuffersfrom, is the lack of a singleresponsibleagentamongall of the contractors
supportingthe program. As a.result,no one entity feelsthe total responsibility for the shuttle
operation; therefore, no advocate exists for overall cost reduction. This deficiency is the major
fault with the two node concept. That is, this concept requires NASA to maintain the costly
interface management at all levels of the program and precludes the large cost savings the team
believes will be achieved by integrating the myriad of.activities that span all of the support
contracts.
While NASA-to-contractor interfaces could be' reduced in this approach and cost efficiencies
realizedwithin each node, NASA would still be required to perform a significant integration and
mediation function between the nodes. This would make it diflScult to realize_efliciencies across
the nodes--a key area where overlap exists today and is likely to endure. In addition, this option
would foster an adversarial relationship between centers and their respective contractor
organizations.
Attempting to use this concept as an intermediate step to a single-business approach would
elongate the transition time, providing a greater potential for not achieving the final result an-d_
unnecessarily delaying many cost reductions.
Option 3 consolidates all program operations under a single-business entity, such as a prime
contractor. This option lays the groundwork for increasing the contractors role and responsibility
in the Shuttle Program, allows the contractor to focus on shuttle operations, and provides for a
more direct introduction of profit motive and cost reduction. While this approach is the greatest
departure from the present system, if properly structured and staffed, it holds the greatest
potential for cutting costs by consolidating, minimizing government-contractor interfaces, and
giving the contractor the incentive and authority to realize efficiencies. In addition, this approach
supplies the advantage of providing a single strong industry advocate for the Shuttle Program.
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The challenges of this option lie in continuing safe and successful operations during the transition
period and the initial stages of delegating much of the responsibilities to the single-business entity.
The fundamental premises of this option are
(1) Separation of the operations functions from the development activities within the program.
(2) Elevation of the NASA-contractor interface to the program level to disengage NASA from
daily operations activities and empower the contractor to assume this responsibility•
(3) Development of a contract structure to incentivize the contractor to reduce operations cost
while maintaining safet) of flight and mission success.
Several different single-business approaches were considered with the prime contractor option
considered most attractive. Other concepts included a business consortium, joint venture, and
government owned-contractor operated (GOCO) arrangement. It became evident that the
construction of a joint venture or business consortium would be difficult to achieve in any
reasonable length of time, if it could be achieved at all.
Because the prime contractor approach does not suffer from these detl-iments, the t_a concihded
that it was the most achievable and'practical approach. In addition, selecting a prime contractor
from among the current contractois, as opposed to an open competition, could accomplish all of
the objectives ina less disruptive and more expeditious manner, realizing potential cost reductions
earlier.
Prime Contractor Concept
The basic feature of this new program structure separates development from operations and
ultimately has most of the NASA-to-contractor interface at the program office level. Most of the
operations will be the responsibility of the prime contractor with minimal NASA involvement and
J"
interface.
Current hardware and software development would continue to be a NASA function with future
developmental modifications considered and evaluated to improve operations, provide additional
- capabilities as needed, or test and develop new technologies to be integrated into the program.
The deputy program manager will utilize center resources, including small project offices and
center Engineering and Development, to perform and manage the bloc updates to the shuttle. As
- NASA completes the currently planned developmental modifications to increase shuttle
performance, further change must be minimized. At some future point, it is envisioned that
NASA might even be phased out of shuttle development and any further modifications, if
required, would then be identified and implemented by the prime contractor.
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To facilitate an understanding of the effects of this option, the review team developed the
following conceptual diagram showing what this organization might look like after
implementation. This diagram is useful in understanding the concept, but is not intended to
provide definitive detail. The review team believes that the details of the organizational structure
should be left to NASA.
Space Shufle
Program Office
- Contractor
r
° "'" 1
Launch Ops Mission Ops
": • . ....
Production
i
Night Production ]
tOrbiter t SRB & SRM
El" _ SSME
Space Shuttle Program Conceptual Diagram
A downsized and centralized NASA program Office and a contractor .program office must be
given the proper authority and top-level NASA support for this structure to be successful. Both
program managers will need to be advocates of this approach and have experience in program
management. TheNASA Program Manager must be empowered with budget, procurement, gj_d
decision-making authority and focus on approving reductions in operational requirements,
developing regulations, and monitoring modifications to the vehicle hardware and software. The
contractor Program Manager should report to the Chief Executive Officer and will focus on
program operations and flight hardware production. The associated support staffs must be
knowledgeable of space shuttle operations and muki-talented to facilitate changes which improve
efficiency while maintaining safe and reliable missions.
The operations and production branches were primarily viewed as contractor functions. Flight
production comprises the manufacturing of the hardware elements that make up the Shuttle
vehicle. Program operations were defined as the activities associated with the vehicle and payload
preparation, launch operations, mission operations, and landing operations. The flight production
organization would provide the orbiter, external tanks, Solid Rocket Motor/Solid Rocket Booster
(SRM/SRB), and Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) to the Program Operations organization for
processing. Vehicle and payload processing necessary to deliver an integrated vehicle to the pad
will be performed under the Program Operations organization. The loNstics and sustaining
engineering functions reside within Program Operations as well.
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The production branch of the organization would supply flight hardware to the operation branch
for launch processing. This interface must be contractually structured to allow the prime
contractor to implement efficiencies in processing the hardware while precluding the unnecessary
stacking of fees. The SSME will require special consideration in the production branch due to .its
criticality and continued developmental nature. NASA involvement in the SSME project will
probably be necessary for a period of time until modifications are implemented that make it more
reusable and operational. It is also recognized that expertise may need to be enhanced within the
contractor organization prior to NASA withdrawing from the SSME project.
This concept calls for minimal NASA-involvement below the program office level on the
operations side. However, it is recognized that, at least initially, maintaining some key NASA
functions critical to the future of the agency may be appropriate. As a result, mission and crew
operations are viewed as NASA _institutional capabilities, supporting multiple programs.
Maintaining these capabilities within NASA is important for the development of expertise,
experience and leadership for future NASA programs. Support to these institutional functions in
the areas of flight software, facilities support, flight design, mission products, and training will be
provided by the b.ontractor. • Similarly, it maybe beneficial for NASA't0 retain some k-e_ l_unch
operations functions as well. In establishing NASA functions on the operations side, however, it
must be recognized that a key elein'ent in reducing overall cost is severely limiting the number of
NASA-to-contractor interfaces.
Conditions Required to Pursue Goals Within New Management Structure
A number of .conditions will be required to ensur e the pursuit of cost-effective operations. They
can be grouped into the areas of minimizing vehicle modifications; consolidating, reducing and
streamlining NASA oversight and involvement, Sti-_g payload processing; and establishing
proper contract incentives and flexibility:
Minimize Vehicle Modifications
Recommendation 3: Minimize vehicle modifications. Freeze the current vehicle hardware and
software configuration. Implement future modifications using a bloc update concept. These bloc
updates should be justified and only made to improve safety, reduce operating costs, make the
vehicle more reusable, or test new technologies.
The continuous hardware and software modifications typical of a developmental program are
costly to implement. Changes permeate the entire program including vehicle checkout and
testing, operational procedures,, and crew training. Associated facility changes, including
processing facilities and simulators, to support configuration updates tend to be cosily. Freezing
the current vehicle configuration, hardware and software, will stabilize the program and allow
reductions in cost. Vehicle testing and turnaround requirements will diminish, facility and
simulator configurations will stabilize, and few updates to crew procedures and training will be
required. This frozen configuration could be labeled the bloc I configuration, and all associated
operations would stabilize with additional cost efficiencies realized.
14
Futurechangesshouldbeminimizedandconcentrateonmakingthevehiclemorereusableand
operational.A goalto fly thevehiclesomenumberof times(for example,five) with minimal
testingandcheckoutshouldbeestablishedandpursued.A budgetfor operationalimprovements
shouldbeestablishedwith changesimplementedthroughtheblocupdateconcept.Modifications
to further increasepayloadperformanceshouldbecarefullyscrutinizedandaccomplishedonly
whenabsolutelyrequired. It is importantto maintainthisdevelopmentactivityseparatefrom the
operations,allowingtheproperfocusoneffectiveandefficientoperations,anddeliveringthese
futurechangesasblocupdates.Thischangein culturemustbeadheredto in orderto achievethe
goalsprescribed.
Recommendation 4: Initiate a requirements review, top level down, with the goal of significantly
reducing requirements based on operations experience. This type of review could significantly
reduce vehicle turnaround and checkout requirements based upon hardware reliability, criticality,
and redundancy.
_.The Shuttle_Program is burdened with requirements typical of a developmental vehicle. As
changes to the hardware and so fl;3vare configuration are minimized and the vehicle is transitioned
to an operational vehicle, an. adjustment in the requirements, taking advantage of acquired
operational experience, is appropriate. The vehicle was designed with a significant amount of
redundancy which could be utilized not only for safety, but also for operational flexibility. With
an unchanging vehicle configuration, the ability to reduce vehicle turnaround _nd checkout
requirements is further enhanced. Most anomalies could be handled in a return-to-print fashion.
Overall operations will become more routine and be more conducive to greater contractor
responsibility. Such a stable configuration will help to ensure continued safe operation during
further transition. " _...... _-..... .........
Recommendation 5: Ensure future performance upgrades to support International Space Station
Alpha (IS SA) or other payloads are established through a systems engineering process to
determine the most advantageous and cost-effective approach.
A large number of performance upgrades are in work in the Shuttle Program resulting from
payload lift requirements levied by the ISSA. These performance upgrades, which include
modifcafions to the SRB, External Tank, and SSME, have a goal of obtaining approximately
13,000 lb. of additional performance margin and .result in the certification of 5 different vehicle
configurations over the next 3 years.
The review committee is especially concerned with the modifications to reduce the weight of the
SRB by approximately 12,000 lb. to obtain 1200 lb. additional performance. Additionally, the
committee is concerned with the Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT) and SSME improvements.
Specifically, the new alloy, aluminum-lithium, being used in the SLWT to reduce its weight by
8000 lb. has the potential for problems during development and manufacturing. In addition, the
committee expressed concern over the potential of utilizing the SSME improvements for
increased thrust capability instead of increased operational margin. Given the criticality and
magnitude of changes to the shuttle elements involved, these modifications were met with concern
by the review team. In the future, all.other alternatives should be pursued prior to changes of this
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impact and magnitude. This would include,in the caseof the ISSA performanceupgrades,to
evaluatealternativeoptions, suchas adjusting packagingand assembly,modifying payload
supportequipment,reducingthenumberof crewmembers,andloweringorbit inclination.
Consolidation and Reduction of NASA Involvement and Oversight
Recommendation 6: Reduce NASA involvement and oversight in the operation of the space
shuttle, transferring responsibility of daily operations to the contractor. Space Shuttle Program
and Project elements should be consolidated and reduced with NASA-contractor interfaces
minimized.
With the transition to an operational program and a more stable vehicle hardware and software
•configuration, the need for extensive NASA involvement in operations would no longer be
required. As the vehicle configuration becomes increasingly more stable and operations
streamlined, increasing reliance can be placed on the contractor. NASA should then remove itself
from day-to-day operations , allowing the prime contractor to meet the requirements in the most
efficient manner.
Also, it follows that NASA Spa_ Shuttle Program and Project elements can be consolidated and
reduced. NASA personnel can be transferred to center/line organizations to maintain and utilize
their expertise across NASA programs. NASA involvement in the Shuttle Program can be
concentrated in developing and integrating the bloc updates, developing the overall operational
requirements, and monitoring and evaluating contractor performance. Consolidation of the
NASA elements will enable corresponding consolidation of contractor elements, minimize NASA-
contractor interfaces, and reduce operating costs. ' " '__ :.
Recommendation 7: Restructure and reduce the overall SR&QA element. ./.
A large and complex SR&QA element does not necessarily insure the total safety of the shuttle.
Indeed, such numerous layers of checks and balances tend to dilute responsibility and generate
unm_zessary work. Spaceflight remains an inherently risky-venture; yet these risks can be
managed effectively. When operating a stable and proven vehicle configuration with associated
reduced turnaround and testing procedures, the need for an over-abundance of NASA oversight
in the SR&QA area is greatly diminished.
Restructuring SR&QA to minimize parallelism and delegate greater responsibility to the
contractor will help to establish clear lines of responsibility with only the necessary checks and
balances in place. While the Challenger accident was a terrible tragedy, it is not justification to
ignore the total space shuttle flight experience nor conclude that the program cannot be made
more productive and tess costly to operate while still maintaining the necessary checks and
balances of a safe program. Restructuring and streamlinine the SR&QA element presents a
tremendous challenge to NASA and its contractors, but must occur if significant progess in cost
reduction is to be achieved.
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Payload Processing
Recommendation 8: Streamline Payload processing and integration, minimizing costs and
reducing the length of time required to integrate a payload aboard the space shuttle.
The design and execution of space shuttle mission objectives remains successful and the time
required to process and integrate payloads has been reduced in the last several years; yet the
payload integration template remains complex and still requires payload assignment well over a
year prior to flight: Payload and cargo integration was found to be a long, tedious and complex
operation involving many organizations. Consolidation of the organizations with clearly defined
responsibilities will be required to simplifi, this operation.
At the root of this complex operation exists the basic philosophy of compliance versus one of
advocacy. The organization should continuously look for creative ways to reduce the
requirements levied.on the customer and simplify the overall integration template. Alternative
standards and methods for integration need to_ be@,ursued. Payload design guidelines should be .....
provided to potential customers that reduce testing and analysis. Until the payload processing
organization is provided the.motivation to become an advocate for payload integration, the
system will remain one of compliance.
Contract and Related Conditions
Recommendation 9: .Structure operational contracts to provide real incentive to accomplish safe
and successful missions.
The contractor must be allowed to make a profit, with contracts structured to provide incentives
to reduce costs and at the same time maintain safe and successful flight operations. This would
include long,term savings sharing and appropriate rewards and penalties based upon schedule and
in-flight performance. Additionally, the prime contractor's financial arrangements with
subcontractors must be structured so that they preclude costly fee stacking including general and
administrative costs and material processing control costs.
Recommendation 10: NASA must pursue innovative approaches in assembling and supporting
the prime contractor tearn_ This could include the hiring of NASA civil servants by the contractor
and initially allowing the contractor to use specific government capabilities.
It is recognized that the contractor(s)may not currently possess all of the necessary personnel
with the talent, expertise, or experience to assume responsibility for daily shuttle operations. One
resource for obtaining those personnel is within NASA. Therefore, it is vital that NASA and the
contractors pursue the necessary steps to not only allow, but encourage, the transfer of personnel
to assume key roles and responsibilities in the proposed new contractor organization. Similarly, it
may be advantageous to allow the prime and/or its subcontractors to initially utilize, by some
means of understanding , specific government organizational elements with critical skills that
cannot be obtained elsewhere (e.g. a cooperative agreement). Integration and downsizing of the
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NASAorganizationwould occurgraduallyover timeasthecontractororganizationdevelopedits
ownin-houseskill baseor thetaskwascompletedor phasedout.
Likewise,it will be necessaryto realize that, in somecases,specificexpertiseexists only in
particular contractors. For example, in the area of orbiter obsolescenceand sustaining
engineeringa specificexpertisewill be requiredto assurethecontinuedoperationof the vehicle.
Attentionto thesespecializedskillswill be requiredastheNASA-contractorteamisconstructed.
Future Considerations
Recommendation 11 : All artificial barriers which preclude the shuttle from carrying certain types
of payloads should be removed. This would require policy and statutory changes which currently
•discourage the shuttle from carrying commercial payloads.
It is possible that a significant reduction in space shuttle operations costs may stimulate the space
eco..nomy., In or_der to maximize the potential economic base for the space shuttle, artificial
barriers including policy (e.g. National Space Policy) and statutory requirements,-[imiting the
types of payloads which may be .caixied should be removed. This will maximize the possibility of
generating revenues in the future.
Recommendation 12: As the prime contractor management approach develops and matures,
NASA should consider further industry involvement and progression toward the privatization of
the space shuttle.
Increasing industry involvement in the operation of the space shuttle can be viewed as one of the
first steps :toward the commercialization of space flight. Assuming industry were willing to invest
capital and accept financial risks of selling flight services,, privatization of the shuttle may become
• jr"
feasible. The proposed consolidation of operations under a single prime contractor offers an
opportunity to test this concept. Future launch systems could be envisioned as following this
pattern and, thereby, encourage capital investment by the space entrepreneurs of the next century.
NASA promotion and encouragement of progression toward greater industry participation is both
appropriate and vital for it to succeed. In the space shuttle, NASA possesses the only reusable
vehicle capable of flying humans to and fi-om space. Other than paper designs, no other vehicle
approaches the capability, reliability, or proven success of the space Shuttle. The future challenge
of the Space Shuttle Program is to progress to operational status and then determine the
economic viability and contribution capacity of its space technology. This is a necessary step in
the progression to commercial space flight and will allow NASA and private industry to make
reasonable comparisons in economy between the shuttle and proposed reusable launch vehicles in
the future.
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TRANSITION PLAN
The review team recognizes that the transition from the current Space Shuttle Program structure
to that recommended could be somewhat disruptive to current operations, could cause concern
among the NASA and contractor communities, and cannot be completed overnight. However,
completing the transition as soon as possible will be in the best interest of the Shuttle Program
and the agency. Further, the team determined that they did not possess the detailed knowledge or
time required to develop a step-by-step transition plan for NASA. Instead, the team outlined an
approach and recognized that the detailed transition plan must be developed by the implementing
team.
The transition was envisioned to occur in three major steps:
(1) Selection of a prime contractor.
-(2) Implementation of the organizationat structure within NASA_and the prime contractor.
(3) Transfer of activities and functions to theprime and sub-contractors.
.
The details of the transition should be developed by the agency and its contractors to minimize the
perturbations to ongoing operations. Above all, the team acknowledged that the key to a
successful transition is staunch support from senior-level NASA management and the
empowerment of NASA and contractor shuttle managers.
A competition based on a NASA Request for Proposal would result in lost savings during the
time required to conduct such a competition and possibly unacceptable disruption to the NASA
•flight schedule. To avoid these difficulties, a prime contractor could be selected by the agency
from the present contractors. /.-
NASA and the prime contractor would begin implementation of the new program structure by
establishing the NASA Shuttle Program Office along with the prime contractor Program Office.
Concurrently, the agency would begin the devgl0p'ment-oftlig basic scope for the prime contract,
as well as the definition of the responsibility, accountability, budget and procurement authority
each Program Office will hold. Activities and tasks would transition in a step-by-step process
from the NASA Program Office to the contractor Program Office. As these functions and
personnel are transitioned, all offices established to manage this activity would be dissolved.
NASA would continue its management of the current performance enhancement development
activities allowing the contractor to focus on the mission and launch operations. This process
would allow for a proper transition of the industry team and a transition of the NASA personnel
to other programs and projects at the appropriate time.
During this time, serious attention should also be given to consolidation and integration of the
multitude of support contracts that exist at Johnson, Kennedy, and Marshall. Reliance on many
government facilities for products and processing will necessitate the negotiation of
memorandums of agreement or other similar arrangements.
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Those functions that are to remain institutional and which will be performed by NASA must be
identified by the agency. Functions such as mission operations and flight crew operations were
recognized by the team as being in this category, but others may exist in the area of launch
operations.
The specific timing of transitioning the day-to-day operation from NASA to the contractor will of
course vary because of many factors. As an example, it is recognized that the SSME will remain
the most critical of all the hardware pieces for a considerable time. The continued development of
pumps, engine structure, throat modifications, etc. will require NASA to .remain involved with the
engine contractor. Also, the team realizes that much of the engine knowledge resides at Marshall
and should be given special consideration.
.To make this transition as expeditiously as possible, a strong commitment to the approach from
NASA and the present contractors is required. Opposition to the changes proposed in this report
will come from within and outside NASA, but these must be overcome if the goals of this report
are to be met.
Finally, to ensure the rapid progresS-of the transition, the administrator may choose to establish an
oversight panel to periodically mbiaitor the progress of the agency and contractor base in moving
to the proposed Shuttle Program structure.
/
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APPENDIX A - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1: Establish a more balanced set of goals for the Shuttle Program, with a
greater emphasis on reducing operational costs and making payload integration more user
friendly. The following goals provide a better balance between operations and safety, and address
the overall NASA objective of reducing the cost of access to space.
(1) Perform safe space shuttle operations while accomplishing mission objectives.
(2) Reduce the cost of space shuttle operations.
(3) Provide user-friendly payload integration.
Recommendation 2: Modify the program's management structure, separating development from
operations and relinquish the majority of the operational responsibility to a prime contractor.
Recommendation 3: Minimize vehicle modifications. Freeze the current vehicle hardware and
software configuration. Implement future modifications using a bloc update concept. These bloc
updates should be justified an&only made to improve safety, reduce operating costs, make the
vehicle more reusable, or test new technologies.
Recommendation 4: Initiate a requirements review, top level down, with the goal of significantly
reducing requirements based on operations experience. This type of review could significantly
reduce vehicle turnaround and checkout requirements based upon hardware reliability, criticality,
and redundancy.
Recommendation 5: Ensure future performance upgrades to support International Space Station
Alpha (ISSA) or other payloads are established through a systems engineering process to
determine the most advantageous and cost-effective approach.
Recommendation 6: Reduce NASA involvement and oversight in the operation of the space
shuttle, transferring responsibility of daily operations to the contractor. Space Shuttle Program
and Project elements should be consolidated and reduced with NASA-contractor interfaces
minimized
Recommendation 7: Restructure and reduce the overall SR&QA element.
Recommendation 8: Streamline Payload processing and integration, minimizing costs and
reducing the length of time required to integrate a payload aboard the space shuttle.
Recommendation 9: Structure operational contracts to provide real incentive to accomplish safe
and successful missions.
Recommendation 10: NASA must pursue innovative approaches in assembling and supporting
the prime contractor team. This could include the hiring of NASA civil servants by the contractor
and initially allowing the contractor to use specific government capabilities.
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Recommendation 11 All artificial barriers which preclude the shuttle from carrying certain types
of payloads should be removed. This would require policy and statutory changes which currently
discourage the shuttle from carrying commercial payloads.
Recommendation 12: As the prime contractor management approach develops and matures,
NASA should consider further industry involvement and progression toward the privatization of
the space shuttle.
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APPENDIX B - TEAM ACTMTIES
Kennedy Space Center Review
The team convened at KSC on December 5 and 6, 1994, to review the KSC" civil servant and
contractor organizations which support ground operations, vehicle, and payload processing for
the Shuttle Program: The reviews were held in the KSC Headquarters Building, Center
Director's Conference Room.
December 5, 1994
Shuttle Management and Operations Jay F. Honeycutt, Director
Robert B. Sieck, Dep. Director
Space Shuttle Program Office
- .
Brewster H. Shaw, Director, Space
Shuttle Operations
David C Schultz, Management
Integration
James B. Costello, Business Manager
Shuttle Logistics Project Management Roger D. Enlow, Manager
Installation Management and Operations Marvin L. Jones, Director
Payload Management and Operations John T. Conway, Director
"/i_"
December 6, 1994
Shuttle Processing Contract Gerry T. Oppliger, President,
Lockheed Space Operations
•Company
Base Operations Contract J. R. Dubay, Project Manager,
EG&G Florida, Inc.
Orbker Logistics Operations Contract Lee D. Solid, VP-GM, Florida
Operations, Rockwell Space Systems
Division
Payload Ground Operations Contract George Faenza, VP-GM
McDonnell Douglas Space &
Defense Systems, KSC Division
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Marshall Space Flight Center Review
The team convened at JSC on December 14, 1994, to review the MSFC civil servant and
contractor organizations which support the Main Engine, External Tank, Solid Rocket Motor and
Solid Rocket Booster Projects for the Shuttle Program. The review was held in Building 1,
conference room 966.
December 14, 1994
MSFC Overview Alex A. McCool, Manager, Space
Shuttle Projects Office
Space Shuttle Main Engine Project Gerry C. Ladner, Manager
Solid Rocket Booster Project Cary H. Rutland, Manager
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor Project V. Keith Henson, Manager
External Tank Project Parker V. Coums, Manager
SSME Prime Contractor Al L. Hallden, VP-Program Manager,
SSME Program, Rocketdyne
SRB Prime Contractor
_ • _ :: _,_ ' '.i. "
Donald K. Reed, Senior Vice
President, SRB Programs, USBI Co.
RSRM Prime Contractor Joe A. Lombardo, VP<& GM
Thiokol Space Operations, Thiokol
ET Contractor Jon A. Dutton, VP-ET Project,
Manned Space Systems, Martin
Marietta
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Johnson Space Center Review
The team convened at JSC on December 15 and 16, 1994, to review the JSC civil servant and
contractor organizations which support the Orbiter and EVA Projects, sustaining engineering,
and mission operations for the Shuttle Program. The reviews were held in Building 1, conference
room 966.
December 15, 1994
JSC Projects Office
EVA and Crew Equipment Office
Orbiter Project Office
Space Shuttle Systems and Operations
Engineering Directorate
Lawrence S. Bourgeois, Acting
Manager
Clay E. McCullough, Manager
Daniel M. Germany, Manager
Lawrence G. Williams, Manager
Integration Office
Leonard S. Nicholson, Acting
Director
Safety, Reliability and Quality
Assurance Office
SpaCe andLife Sciences Directorate
Mission Operations Directorate
Charles S. Harlart, Director
Donald E. Robbins, Acting Director
John W. O'Neill, Director
Brock R_ Stone, Assistant Director
for Operations
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JSC Review
December 16, 1994
Rockwell Overview
System and Payload Integration
Orbiter Production
Space Operations Contract
•Space Shuttle Avionics Software
Safety, Reliability, and Quality
Assurance Co. htract
i !: = .
Mission Systems Contract
Engineering, Test and Analysis
Conixact
Hight Equipment Processing Contract
Flight Crew Systems Development
Contract
Robert G. Minor, President,
Rockwell Space Systems Division
Marty Cioffoletti, VP-Program
Director, Space Systems Integration
& Cargo
Jim Eyman, Vice President, Orbiter
Operations
Harold Draughon, Program Director,
STS Operations
Glynn S. Lunney, VP-GM Houston
Operations
Ted W. Keller, Project Coordination,
Loral Avionics & Comm.Operation
Sam A. Boyd, Director, SRM&QA
Operation, Loral
LeRoy Hall, Vice President, Mission
Systems Operation,/Loral Space
Information Systems
M. M. Miller, VP-PM,
Engineering, Test and Analysis
Program, Lockheed Engineering &
Sciences Company
G. W. Davis, Program Manager,
FEPC, Boeing
W. T. Short, President, Johnson
Engineering Corp.
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Chief Executive Officer Discussions
The team convened at JSC on January 4-6, 1994, to hold discussions with the Chief Executive
Officers, or their named representative, of corporations which play a major role in the operations
functions for the Space Shuttle Program. Additionally, a summary of the findings of the
Functional Work:force Review Team was presented, and a second session with the Shuttle
Program Office was held. The meetings were held in Building 1, conference rooms 945 and 966.
January_ 4, 1994
Rockwell International
.°.
Donald R. Beall, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer
Kent M. Black, Executive VP and
Chief Operating Officer
Robert G. Minor, President Rockwell
Space Systems Division
Glynn S. Lunney, VP-GM Rockwell
Houston Operations
Lockheed Corporation Daniel M. Tellep, Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer
Robert B. Young, President,
Lockheed Technology Services
Group
Gerry T. Oppliger, President,
Lockheed Space Operations
Company
James C. Adamson, Executive VP,
Lockheed Engineering and Sciences
Company
Thiokol Corporation James 1L W'tlson, president and Chief
Executive Officer
Joseph A. Lombardo, VP-GM, Space
Operations
Martin Marietta Corporation Peter B. Teets, President, Martin
Marietta Space Group
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January_ .5, 1994
McDonnell Douglas Aerospace & Defense Systems
United Technology Corporation
Fun_ional Workforce Review Team Summary
Charles A. Ordahl, Senior VP, Space
Defense Systems
George R. Faenza, VP-GM, Kennedy
Space Center Division
Joseph P. Zimonis, Executive VP and
GM, USBI Company
Charles D. Nelson, Director,
Program Control, SRB Programs
David Mobley, Team Chairman
January 6, 1994
Space Shuttle Program Office
Loral Space Information Systems
Brewster H. Shaw, Director, Space
Shuttle Operations
Clint H. Denny, President
A.A. (Sam)Boyd, VP, SR&QA
Operation
LeRoy Hall, Vice President, Mission
Systems Operation
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APPENDIX C - SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM MAJOR CONTRACTORS
The tables listed in this appendix are intended to identify the major contracts providing support to
the Space Shuttle Program. They are not meant to be an exhaustive or complete listing of the all
contracts within the Shuttle Program, but are designed to convey the magnitude of several major
contracts, as well as the expanse of the subcontractor domain. All information was taken from
material contained in either the NASA or contractor briefings to the review team.
Kennedy Space Center
;_ 7
Contract/Function Prime $M Contractor CS Team Members/
EP FTE Subcontractors
Shuttle Processing Lockheed 533 6309 613" Gnmunan,. Thiokol,
Contract Johnson Controls;
TI'S, Rocketdyne,
Bionetics, Wiltecl_ USI,
- "- EG&G
Orbiter Logistics Rockwell 199 1340 No major subs, suppliers
only
EG&G 38 520 164 Precision Fabrication,
Atlantic Technical
Services, Sherikon,
Wiltech,. Unified Services
Associates
Base Operations
"Payload Ground McDonnell 115 977 350 No major subs
Operations Contract Douglas
"Includes Launch Operations civil servants that work Orbiter Logistics contract as well.
-PGOC is not funded through the Shuttle Program, all funding shown is through Codes M (utilization), X, or U.
Marshall Space Flight Center
Contract/Function Prime SM Contractor CS Team Members/
EP FTE Subcontractors
SSME Rocketdyne 287 2018 205 Honeywell, Hydraulic
P&W 85 " 334 Research, Pratt & Whitney
SRB USBI 162 1024 115 Sundstrand, Moog, Allied-
Signal
RSRM Thiokol 416 2589 100 North American Rayon,
KM, Wecco, Ladish
External Tank Martin 370 2635 134 Kaiser Aluminum,
Marietta Reynolds Metals, GE,
Grumman
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Johnson Space Center
Contract/Function Prime $M Contractor
EP
CS
FTE
Team Members/
Subcontractors
Orbiter Production,
Ops/Launch Support,
Spares (Orbiter Project)
Rockwell 288 1803 292 Honeywell, Hamilton
Standard, Sundstrand, Ball
Brothers, IFC, Loral
(of 20 Directed Subs)
Systems & Ops
Integration (Program
Office)
Rockwell 151 699 118 No major subs
Space Operations
Contract (Mission
Operations)
Flight Software Dev
SR&QA
Mission Support Contract
(MCC Dev)
Rockwell 264 2214 371
Loral 35 280
20 251
21 170
114
43
Unisys, Hernandez
Engineering, Allied-
Signal, Barrios, SAIC
Syscom Development;
Ebasco, GHG;
UniTs, Booz-Allen,
Cimarron Software, DEC,
IBM
Engineering, Test and
Analysis Contract
39 490 380" McDonnell Douglas,
Oceaneering, TRW, GB
Tech, Hemandez Eng.,
Svscom Development
Medical Sciences Krug, 4
Kelsey 1
Seybold
Flight Crew Support Johnson 12
•_..... ..... En_ueefing
EVA. Ham Std 25
RMS
Flight Equipment
Pl_ocessing Contract
39
13
12 No major subs
0
120 29
119 26
SPAR 13 60
Boeing 35 333
ILC Industries, Airlock,
Inc., Caarleton
Tectfaologies;
BEI Motion Systems,
DEVTEC, Novatronics;
Ham Std, ILC, David
Clark, Pacific Scientific,
Martin Marietta
Includes Engineering Directorate civil servants that work the Flight Software Development contract as well.
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APPENDIX D - TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND SUPPORT STAFF
Jay F. Honeycutt,
Director, Shuttle Management and Operations, Kennedy Space Center.
David C. Leestma,
Director, Flight Crew Operations, Johnson Space Center.
Bill Mackey,
Independant Consultant; former Chairman of the Board, Lifemark Corporation
John W. O'Neill,
Director, Mission Operations, Johnson Space Center.
George F. Page,
Independant Consultant;
Kennedy Space. Center
former Deputy Center Director and Shuttle Operations Director,
Cary H. Rutland,
Manager, SRB Project, Marshall Space Flight Center.
Robert B. Sieck,
Deputy Director/Launch Director, Shuttle Management and Operations, Kennedy Space Center.
Jeffery W. Bantle,
Flight Director, Johnson Space Center.
•Cliff L. Farmer,
Chief_ Display & Control Development Office, Johnson Space Center.
W'flliam W. Parsons, Jr.,
Special Assistant to the Director, Shuttle Management and Operations, Kennedy Space Center.
Michael E. Read,
Analyst, Space Shuttle Business Management Office, Johnson Space Center.
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